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Abstract
This article examines the principles outlined in the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) in the context of social network data. We
provide both a practical guide to GDPR-compliant social network data
processing, covering aspects such as data collection, consent, anonymiza-
tion and data analysis, and a broader discussion of the problems emerging
when the general principles on which the regulation is based are instanti-
ated to this research area.
1 Introduction
In the last decade online social network platforms have become a major source
of data to study human and social behaviour [14, 3]. The availability of persis-
tent and searchable traces of human communication on a large scale [6] provided
new, previously inconceivable opportunities for unobtrusive research, but also
raised new questions related to the potential misuse of personal information
[18, 24]. Following events such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and related
restrictions on research-related data access established by large social media
companies, some Internet researchers have highlighted the necessity and com-
plexity of ensuring that “independent, critical research in the public interest
can be conducted while protecting ordinary users’ privacy”1. For European
researchers, this context is further complicated by the recent advent of the Gen-
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eral Data Protection Regulation2 (GDPR), which came into force on the 25th
of May 2018.
The GDPR is a piece of European legislation regulating how natural persons
should be protected with regards to the processing of their personal data. The
GDPR applies to processing of personal data in very similar ways in all EU
Member States, for all sectors (public or private) and all purposes (commercial
and non-commercial). This includes research performed by private companies
or public universities and other research institutions. The regulation has been
welcomed as a progressive step towards rectifying the glaring power imbalance
in current mass digital data collection by entities that develop, maintain and
control access to digital infrastructures. The GDPR has two main goals3. The
first goal is to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects
by creating a protective regiment with regards to the processing of personal
data4. This is because new technologies and organisational models both in the
private and public sector have made it easy to gather, use, combine, aggregate
or otherwise process a vast amount of personal data without sufficient controls
or oversight. The second goal is to create the optimal conditions so that the free
flow of personal data – in parallel to the free movement of goods and services –
can take place within the EU, supporting the creation of the European Single
Market. The GDPR is intended to provide a way of achieving the free flow of
data within the EU while ensuring protection of the fundamental rights and
freedoms for individuals.
The regulation replaces the earlier Data Protection Directive5 which, as a di-
rective, was adopted and implemented through different national laws by every
EU Member State, resulting in at times confusing patchwork of national regula-
tions. More importantly, the earlier directive did not have any specific focus on
research. Rather, the main regulatory mechanisms were codes of conduct and
ethical guidelines advocating good practices but rarely systematically codifying
these. In contrast, the GDPR explicitly recognizes the particularities of data
processing in research through a series of formally specified research exemptions,
which have important consequences on the feasibility and lawfulness of social
network research projects in practice. This includes the ability to limit and
even avoid restrictions on secondary processing and the processing of sensitive
categories of data6, to override the subjects’ right to object to processing and
erasure as long as relevant safeguards are implemented7, and to collect some
2Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data.
3Rec 1-7 GDPR and SOU 2017:50, p78
4In the context of GDPR ’personal data’ means any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person; an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
5Directive 95/46/EC
6Art 6(4) and rec 50 GDPR
7Art 89 GDPR
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types of data without consent for some types of processing8.
The impact of the new rules on the practice of research is unclear and this
is especially relevant to researchers studying social network data (both on- and
offline), where for example the subjects participating in a study may provide
information about non-participants and the collected data is more difficult to
effectively anonymize than in other research fields. This article considers the
impact and implications of the GDPR and of the research exemptions built into
the law on the activities of researchers engaging in social network analysis in
general and in the specific case of online social networks.
The text of the GDPR is complex and not specifically targeted to researchers
but its content will impact research practices in significant ways that depend
on the specific research field. On the one hand, universities and other research
institutions are of course providing general information about the GDPR to
their employees, and have a Data Protection Officer who can be contacted for
specific matters. On the other hand, GDPR-compliant strategies need to be
instantiated to the specific research problem, and many of these are difficult
to interpret without domain-specific knowledge. Therefore, researchers should
themselves be aware of the implications of the GDPR and have reflected about
it. Several papers have already been published to address this issue and to
examine the impact of the GDPR on research in general [11, 22, 26] and on
specific research fields [25]. However, none have addressed the implications
of the GDPR for social network analysis, where data processing differs from
other quantitative approaches. For example, Borgatti and Molina [4] point out
that respondent anonymity is not an option if we want to know who is talking
about whom, which is necessary to define edges in the network. In addition,
subjects providing information about their social relations may generate data
about individuals not included in the study: a participant mentioning that
she often performs some activity with someone may reveal a lot about this
other person depending on the type of activity. Another issue is the fact that
in social networks it is often possible to identify specific roles based on the
network structure, with a limited number of individuals in each role, examples
being high-degree and high-betweenness9 nodes as well as other special network
configurations. Once these few nodes have been identified, it becomes very
simple to connect them to specific individuals using some basic knowledge of
the studied organization. For this reason network data is often impossible to
fully anonymize. In this article we will also identify specific issues related to data
protection emerging when social network analysis is applied to contexts such as
the analysis of large-scale networks of social relations derived from social media
data.
In the next section we present a brief overview of the GDPR, including the
terminology used in the rest of the article. This short section is necessary to
make this article self-contained, and it can be skipped by the reader who is
already familiar with the main actors, concepts and principles introduced by
8Art 6(1)(e) and (f); rec 47 and 157 GDPR
9Degree and betweenness are so-called centrality measures, that can be used to identify
important actors in a network.
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the regulation. The following section is organized along the main steps and
problems of a typical social network research process. We start by discussing
approaches to data collection, also highlighting the differences between data
collected directly from the data subjects or indirectly, such as through social
media Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). We also discuss topics such
as consent, data anonymization, profiling, and storage of the networks. We
conclude the article with more general considerations about the implications of
the GDPR for commercial data controllers as well as for the future of network
data repositories which represent important teaching and training tools. We also
suggest that the GDPR should be a new important element to be considered in
the ongoing discussion about the establishment of a code of conduct for social
network research10.
Please note that our objectives are (1) to provide a general understanding
of the impact of the GDPR on social network research for scholars with no
background in law, under the assumption that their institutions will be able to
fill in the details about local regulations but may be unaware of the aspects more
specific to social network data, and (2) to highlight some controversial issues.
It is not our goal to provide a detailed technical legal analysis of the GDPR;
for this we refer to the relevant current debate and scholarly work11. Similarly,
we do not provide legal analyses of specific cases, as this is out of scope for the
article.
2 The GDPR ecosystem: overview and termi-
nology
Before we proceed to our analysis of how the GDPR may affect social network
research in practice it is important to make clear the fundamental terms and
ideas of this piece of law. The regulation is complex in terms of length (88
pages, 173 recitals, 99 articles), breadth of coverage and depth. Here we present
the GDPR concepts and principles that we find are the most relevant for social
network analysis research. In the next section we will discuss the (often unclear)
role that these concepts and principles can play in the various phases of a social
network analysis process. In the article we will refer to articles in both the
GDPR and the recitals. Even though recitals are not part of the operative
10The GDPR applies only to the processing of personal data by entities established in the
European Union regardless the place of processing, or in general to processing of personal
data of data subjects who are in the European Union, as long as the processing is related to
the offering of goods and services in the Union or the monitoring takes place in the Union.
Our presentation will often take the perspective of a European public university, and we
will extend the discussion to other cases regulated by this law when relevant. However, the
principles defined in the GDPR are worthy of consideration even for researchers outside the
European Union processing data from non-EU subjects, as these principles highlight general
fundamental issues to be considered when processing personal data.
11See for example Feiler L, Forgo´ N and Weigl M, The EU General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR): A Commentary (Globe Law and Business 2018) and Kuner C, Bygrave L
and Docksey C (eds), The Eu General Data Protection Regulation (Gdpr): A Commentary
(Oxford University Press 2019).
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text of the regulation their role is of great importance since their purpose is
“to set out concise reasons for the chief provisions of the enacting terms”12.
We will not discuss here the relationship between recitals and articles, but it is
worth keeping in mind that when the legal text of the regulation is somewhat
ambiguous it will normally be interpreted in light of the relevant recital13.
Figure 1: A typical configuration of the GDPR ecosystem.
Figure1 exemplifies the main concepts described in this section in the con-
text of a typical academic research project14. The data subject is defined as
every individual (natural person) who is identified or may be identified by the
controller or third parties, directly or indirectly, by the act of processing her
personal data. The natural or legal persons who decide how and why the per-
sonal data will be processed are the data controllers while the ones that process
the data on behalf of the controller are the data processors15.
What constitutes personal data is defined quite broadly as any information
that does or may lead to the identification of a natural person16. The term
processing is defined similarly broadly as “any operation or set of operations on
personal data or sets of personal data”17, including data collection. A special
type of processing is profiling. With an equally broad definition profiling is
defined as “any form of automated processing of personal data evaluating the
personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict
aspects concerning the data subject’s performance at work, economic situation,
health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or
12LEGAL SERVICE, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ET AL., JOINT PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE
COMMISSION FOR PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE DRAFTING OF LEGISLA-
TION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS (2015), section 10, available
at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3879747d-7a3c-411b-
a3a0-55c14e2ba732.
13Klimas, Tadas and Vaiciukaite, Jurate, The Law of Recitals in European Community
Legislation, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 15, 2008.
14In Section 5.4 we discuss the difference between universities and commercial research.
15Art 4(8) and 4(9) GDPR
16Art 4(1) GDPR
17Art 4(2) GDPR
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movements”18.
A data protection officer is the person designated by the controller and/or
the processor in case the processing a) is carried out by a public authority, b)
contains systematic monitoring of data subjects, or c) consists of large scale
processing of special categories of data19.
These definitions, when applied to research, make clear that any research-
based processing of social network data that not only directly identify but also
possibly may identify (by the same researchers or third parties) individuals will
be regulated under the GDPR.
Typically, in cases where research is conducted under the auspices of a uni-
versity, the university is considered to be the data controller. While universities
are supposed to have organisational measures with regards to the GDPR, the
researchers, as employees of the university, who one way or another process per-
sonal data as part of their role, are also expected to have an understanding of
the GDPR as they design data collection and analysis protocols.
It may happen that other entities assist with the processing, but do not
decide the purposes and the manner of it. For example, a researcher may pay
individuals who are not employees of the university to perform a data collection.
Where these entities are only following the guidelines of the controller, then
these external parties can be seen as data processors, where the “processing by
a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act”20. If the research
is conducted by a private actor, such as a company, then it is the company that is
the controller, and possible external sub-contractors (including researchers) may
constitute the processors. It can also be so that a private party and a university
can both jointly be regarded as controllers, depending on what agreement exists
between these two parties.
As we can see here, in case of more than one entity – meaning different legal
entities – being involved in the processing of personal data, determining the
controller(s) is not always an easy task. It is not sufficient that one entity pro-
cesses data on behalf of another entity, since it is possible that it also processes
these data for its own purposes21. It is not sufficient either that a contract
may explicitly state the roles of the entities, since they in reality may act in a
different way22. The capacity of the controller is based on factual elements and
circumstances, on whether or not an entity can – and does – indeed determine
the purposes and the means of processing - the “whys” and the “hows”. Some
questions that help in determining the role of controller are: why is this pro-
cessing taking place, who initiated it, would an entity process the data if not
asked by another entity and if so under what conditions23.
18https://gdpr-info.eu/recitals/no-71/
19Art 37 GDPR
20Art 28(3) GDPR
21Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party (2010) Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ’con-
troller’ and ’processor’, WP 169, p. 9
22Ibid
23Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party (2010) Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ’con-
troller’ and ’processor’, WP 169, p.8
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P1: lawfulness, fairness and transparency
P2: purpose limitation
P3: data minimization
P4: accuracy
P5: storage limitation
P6: integrity and confidentiality
P7: accountability
Table 1: The seven basic principles in the GDPR
It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the processing can be
defined only by the controller, meaning that if there are more than one entity
defining the purposes of the processing then these entities are joint controllers.
The means, on the other hand, namely the decision on organizational and tech-
nical matters, can be delegated by the controller to a processor. However,
“substantial questions which are essential to the core of lawfulness of process-
ing are reserved to the controller”24. If an entity has the power to decide, for
example, issues related to the period of storage or access privileges, this entity
is, then, de facto a controller concerning this part of the use of data.
These complicated distinctions are important to consider and discuss with
relevant internal data protection officers because their particular specifications
can have an impact on the obligations of the researcher, or alternatively said,
on how to comply with the GDPR. As a simple example, it is the controller
that is responsible for providing specific information to the data subjects.
Given the diversity of research approaches it is important that researchers
understand the particular aspects of the regulation that apply to them. This also
means that any collaborative research project must consider what institutional
agreements must be made with respect to data processing: a process that may
take additional time and must be planned for.
The regulation introduces seven important principles, listed in Table 1, to be
followed when processing personal data25. (P1) The data must be processed in
a lawful, fair and transparent way. (P2) Personal data may only be collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner
that is incompatible with those purposes. (P3) The data may be processed only
if they are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary with regards to
the purpose of processing. (P4) Only data that are accurate and up to date,
to the level that it is possible, may be processed. (P5) Personal data may only
be processed for a period that is necessary for the processing and therefore the
controllers must create criteria to determine what retention periods are suitable
for their purposes. (P6) The controllers must apply technical and organisational
measures in order to protect personal data they control against unauthorised
and unlawful processing as well as accidental loss, destruction or damage. (P7)
24Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party (2010) Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ’con-
troller’ and ’processor’, WP 169, p. 15
25Art 5 GDPR
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The data controllers have the responsibility to be compliant and to be able to
demonstrate compliance when needed, which implies that written records must
be kept on whether and how the controller is compliant26. These principles have
implications for social network analysis research, which are detailed below.
3 The GDPR in the social network analysis pro-
cess
The principles mentioned in the previous paragraph and in Table 1 need to be
instantiated to the specific cases. In this section we will discuss what implica-
tions data processing in the context of research has on the practical enactment
of the principles. We will also detail the meaning of these principles when they
regulate the processing of social network data, emphasizing the cases where
ambiguities arise.
A summary of the main GDPR-related aspects that should be considered
during a social network analysis process, including a list of exemptions that can
be applied in research, is presented in Tables 2 and 3. Detailed explanations are
presented in the text.
3.1 Lawful bases for data processing
The first basic principle of GDPR states that the data must be processed in
a lawful, fair and transparent way. This means that in order for data to be
processed there has to be some lawful basis for doing so. The GDPR lists six
lawful bases for processing of personal data27: a) the data subject has given her
consent, b) it is necessary for the performance of a contract, c) it is necessary
in order for the controller to comply with a legal obligation, d) it is necessary
in order to protect individuals’ (the data subject’s and/or other natural per-
sons’) vital interests, e) it is necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest and f) it is necessary for the purposes of legitimate
interests pursued by the controller as long as these interests are not overridden
by interests and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Even
though there are no specific lawful bases that are a priori dedicated to research,
the three most relevant tend to be (a) the consent of the data subject, (e) the
task carried out in the public interest and (f) the legitimate interests of the
controller.
With a long history starting in medical science the practice of informed
consent has been for long time the central pillar of research practices involving
human subjects [9]. A key element of the GDPR is that, addressing a growing
lack of satisfaction towards the efficacy of informed consent practices [21], it
provides well-defined research exemptions.
26With regards to the principle of accountability we would also like to draw attention to the
provisions of art 24 et seq GDPR defining the liabilities, responsibilities and general obligations
of the controllers and the processors
27Art 6 GDPR
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General rule Exemption Details
1 Identify the roles w.r.t. the
GDPR ecosystem (data subjects,
controllers, processors, DPO. . . )
and the data flows.
no This can be challenging in some cases, consult
the DPO if uncertain.
2 Identify the nature of the data
(personal / non personal / sensi-
tive).
no In case of sensitive data, we can process it (1)
if we have explicit consent, (2) if the data was
manifestly made public by the data subject
(use this carefully), or (3) in case of research
purposes, if there are suitable safeguards (e.g.,
pseudonymization, approval from ethics com-
mittee).
3 Identify explicit and legitimate
purposes for the processing.
yes The specification in case of research can be a
bit more general (such as the general research
area or part of the project, not specific analyt-
ical tasks). Some specification of the intended
purpose is however necessary.
4 Identify the lawful basis for data
processing.
no Based on national legislation, that is still be-
ing produced, some actors conducting research
(e.g. universities) might be assumed to op-
erate in the public interest and therefore the
public task basis may primarily be used. Oth-
erwise the consent and legitimate interests
bases should be examined.
5 Define clear temporal limits
for data processing. Non-
anonymized data can be kept for
no longer than is necessary for
the purposes of the processing.
yes More extended periods may apply in case of
research as long as appropriate safeguards are
implemented.
6 Put in place technical and or-
ganizational measures to pro-
tect the data, e.g., ensure pri-
vacy by design and by default,
pseudonymize the data as soon
as possible.
no The measures should be proportionate to the
aim pursued.
7 In case of profiling perform a
DPIA.
no Consider with the DPO whether a DPIA is
necessary.
Table 2: A summary of general rules and exemptions to be considered during the
social network analysis process. Column Exemption indicates whether explicit
exemptions exist for research, and exemptions (if any) and other considerations
are indicated under Details. Abbreviations used in the table: Data Protection
Officer (DPO), Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). (Part 1)
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General rule Exemption Details
8 Inform the data subjects about
the collection, purposes and their
rights at the time the data is ob-
tained (if obtained directly from
the data subject) or within a
reasonable period after the data
is obtained and no later than a
month (if the data is obtained in-
directly).
yes For secondary data, providing information is
not necessary if the provision of such informa-
tion proves impossible or would involve a dis-
proportionate effort, if this is likely to render
impossible or seriously impair the achievement
of the objectives of the processing.
9 Collect only adequate, relevant
and limited data to what is nec-
essary to achieve the purposes of
the processing.
yes As the purpose may be specified in less precise
terms (see the exception to Rule 3), this rule
is also affected. Consider deleting unwanted
data as soon as possible, acknowledging and
documenting the process.
10 Data subjects have the right to
check if there is data concern-
ing them, and the right to obtain
these data.
no Even if not part of the GDPR, national laws
may still restrict this right, e.g., secrecy acts.
11 Data subjects have the right to
have the data concerning them
erased.
yes Not necessary if it is likely to render impos-
sible or seriously impair the achievements of
the objectives of the processing. National laws
may also restrict this right.
12 Keep data accurate and up to
date.
no
13 If a new purpose emerges, new
legal bases for data processing
should be identified.
yes If the new purpose is research, further pro-
cessing is considered to be compatible to the
initial purpose.
14 If the controller changes the pur-
pose of the processing, informa-
tion must be provided to the
data subject prior to this pro-
cessing.
yes See the exception to Rule 3 about the in-
creased flexibility in the specification of the
purpose in case of research.
15 Keep written records to demon-
strate compliance.
no
Table 3: A summary of general rules and exemptions to be considered during the
social network analysis process. Column Exemption indicates whether explicit
exemptions exist for research, and exemptions (if any) and other considerations
are indicated under Details. (Part 2)
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By examining the GDPR closer, we can notice that when it comes to the
question which lawful basis should be used when processing personal data in
general, the most important parameters to take into consideration are the iden-
tity of the controller 28, the purposes of processing as well as the context of
processing. Depending on these parameters, the controller must decide which
lawful basis to use for processing. In the case of research, the following lawful
bases seem to be the most relevant: the data subject has given her consent
for the processing of her personal data29, the processing is necessary for the
performance of a public task30, and/or it is necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller31.
In the case where a controller is a university, it may be most suitable to
use as a lawful basis that the processing is necessary “for the performance of
a task carried out in the public interest”32. The definition of such tasks is left
to Union or Member States law33. There is, however, no need for an explicit
statutory provision as long as there is a clear basis in law34. Even in cases where
no national legislation is introduced with regards to it, it should be accepted
that pubic actors, such as universities, may use this lawful basis for processing
of personal data35. Since in many countries universities – often even private
ones – are considered to be public authorities by law and they act on carrying
out tasks of public interest, such as conducting research36, the public task basis
for processing personal data seems to be the appropriate lawful basis for a
social network research project, as long as the processing is necessary for that
project37. This lawful basis puts the onus of ensuring that the rights of the data
subject are balanced against the public interest goals of institutions, whose aims
presumably are oriented towards the greater good. This basis is not available
at all to commercial organizations and research labs – at least as long as no law
provides for that – who must rely on consent or the legitimate interest basis to
process personal data.
With regards to the use of consent38 as a lawful basis for the processing of
data in research, there are some things that have to be taken into consideration.
The first one is that even tough this lawful basis can also be used for the process-
28Even though the GDPR applies both to public and private actors, the identity of the
controller may lead to different outcomes, as we will illustrate later in this paper.
29Art 6.1(a) GDPR
30Art 6.1(e) GDPR
31Art 6.1(f) GDPR
32Art 6.1(e) GDPR. See also SOU 2017:50
33Art 6.3 GDPR
34Rec 41 GDPR
35SOU 2017:50, p.18
36See for example in the UK the Freedom of information Act 2000 and in Sweden the Higher
Education Act 1992:1434
37According to art 6.2 and 6.3 GDPR as well as rec. 45 GDPR it is stated that Union or
Member State law shall define whether the controller performing a task of public interest can
be a legal person governed by public law or by private law.
38It is not the goal of this paper to make an analysis on consent as a lawful basis in general
– for a better understanding we refer to the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent
under Regulation 2016/679 – but it is worth reminding here that a consent for processing of
personal data by a data subject has to be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.
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ing of personal data by a research project, an entity may use this lawful basis
only “if a data subject is offered control and is offered a genuine choice with
regard to accepting or declining the terms offered or declining them without
detriment.”39 If this is not possible, something that in social network research
– and research in general – can be the case, then this lawful basis should not be
used 40. Additionally, for public universities since they are public authorities,
researchers must always assess whether or not the consent provided by the data
subjects is valid, namely if it is indeed freely given or it is given as a product
of imbalance in powers between the university and the data subjects41. Lastly,
one should make a distinction regarding the term consent as developed in the
GDPR and as an “ethical standard and procedural obligation”42. That means
that it can be so that the lawful basis for processing is the public task basis,
art 6.1(e) GDPR, but consent is used as an additional safeguard. In this case
it is not two lawful bases used for the processing of personal data but only one,
the public task base; consent is only a procedural obligation and not the lawful
basis provided for in art 6.1(a).
The third possible lawful basis for research is that the processing is necessary
for the legitimate interests43 pursued by the controller or a third party. In
general this basis is the most flexible one; at the same time a controller should
be very careful when using it as a lawful basis. More specifically, the controller
should prove that there is some legitimate interest, that there is a necessity to
process personal data for this legitimate interest, that the interests and rights
of the data subjects are not violated, namely that there is a minimal privacy
impact, as well as that the data subject would not be surprised by such a
processing or is not likely to object. An important thing to remember here is
that it cannot be used as a basis in cases where public authorities are processing
personal data in the performance of their tasks44. Therefore a public university
processing data in the performance of their tasks, which include also research
activities, should probably avoid basing the processing conducted for a research
project on the legitimate interest basis.
One last thing that we would like to add here is that if the personal data
processed are of sensitive character, an entity conducting research - at least an
entity,such as a university, that bases their research activities on some piece
of legislation - may primarily base the lawful processing of such data on the
fact that the processing is necessary for scientific research purposes as long as
appropriate measures are deployed according to art 89.1 and the research is
39Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679, p. 3
40Here it is also important to consider that, as we will argue later in this paper, it can
be difficult to provide information to the data subjects of a network research project and
therefore it can similarly be challenging to provide the possibility for an informed consent.
41In most research projects, this should not be a great issue since data subjects in a network
research project do not normally have a direct connection to a university, but it is still worth
considering possible problems that may arise.
42Art 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679, p 28
43The meaning of legitimate interests is to be interpreted widely and contain both trivial
and more important interests, commercial or societal etc.
44Art 6.1 para 2 GDPR
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based on a law “which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the
essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific
measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data
subject” according to art 9.2(j) GDPR45. Following the same argumentation as
above we could, however, claim that if the processing is not necessary or if there
is still no specific legislation with regards to processing for research purposes,
consent could also be used as a lawful ground for such processing, according to
art 9.2(a) GDPR46.
3.2 Data collection
Social networks can be obtained through a wide range of data collection strate-
gies. Below we detail different approaches to data collection for social network
analysis and consider the corresponding consequences of the GDPR. It is worth
noting that we focus on networks where nodes represent natural persons: the
GDPR does not apply when nodes represent companies, or animals, or even
deceased persons (even though in this last case Member States may provide for
specific rules47).
3.2.1 Primary vs. secondary data collection and the principle of
transparency
An important conceptual and legal distinction resides in the selection of methods
for data collection. For example, there is a significant difference between data
that is collected directly from the data subject (e.g. small-medium scale data
obtained through surveys) and data that is collected through a third actor (e.g.
online social networks obtained from APIs) without the direct involvement of
the data subject. The difference here is not only in the scale or the nature of the
data but in the relation between the data subject and the data controller: two
different articles are concerned with providing information to the data subject
when the data are collected directly from them48 and when data about them
have not been obtained from them49.
In essence, these articles detail some of the ways that the principle of trans-
parency must be put into action. Transparency addresses the right of the data
subject to know and understand how the data are being used; it “requires that
any information addressed to the public or to the data subject be concise, eas-
ily accessible and easy to understand, and [in] clear and plain language [in
45Art 9.2(g), namely that the processing is necessary for reasons of “substantial public
interest” could also be the basis for lawful processing of sensitive personal data but since art
9.2(j) specifically refers to scientific research purposes, processing that takes place for scientific
purposes should be based on the legal ground of art 9.2(j)
46Worth mentioning here that in many countries such processing by a university, even if
consent is given by the data subject, could take place only after an ethics committee permits
it. See also SOU 2017:50 s. 160.
47Rec 27 GDPR
48Art 13 GDPR
49Art 14 GDPR
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particular] in situations where the proliferation of actors and the technological
complexity of practice make it difficult for the data subject to know and under-
stand whether, by whom and for what purpose personal data relating to him or
her are being collected [...].” If personal data are collected, the data subjects
should be informed about the collection and its purposes in order to enable them
to exercise their rights. Note that this is different from consent (explained in
Section 3.1) but instead refers to the information that must be made available
about data processing activities. Essentially, data subjects should be able to
easily find out who might be using their data and for what purposes.
While making the data subjects aware of the processing and of their rights
may seem straightforward when data are collected directly from them, this can
become very difficult to accomplish when large networks are obtained from APIs.
The potential difficulties to provide information under specific circumstances are
acknowledged in the GDPR, where exceptions for research in particular are in-
troduced. Article 14 states that providing information is not necessary if 1) “the
data subject already has the information”; or 2) “the provision of such informa-
tion proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort, in particular
for [...] scientific or historical research purposes”, subject to some safeguards50,
if providing information “is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the
achievement of the objectives of that processing”. Article 14 then continues
stating that “[i]n such cases the controller shall take appropriate measures to
protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including
making the information publicly available”.
These are some examples of the kinds of research exemptions that are em-
bedded in the GDPR, codifying and specifying research conduct. Both those
exemptions apply to social network research based on online data collected from
social media platforms assuming that social media platforms have already in-
formed their users through appropriate Terms of Services that their data will be
shared with third parties (eg. through APIs) or assuming that the large scale of
collected data will require a disproportionate effort to inform all affected data
subjects. This is an example of balancing research needs against the derogation
of the rights of the data subject. Technically termed “proportionality of the
effort”, this is a relatively vague concept. The controller, in order to determine
whether it is going to be disproportionately difficult to provide the information,
must take into consideration the number of data subjects, the age of the data
and if there are any appropriate safeguards already adopted51. If, after this as-
sessment, the controller finds that the effort will be disproportionate, then she
has to assess once again whether the effort involved to provide the information
to the data subject exceeds the impact and effects on the data subject in the case
where the information is not provided. This assessment has to be documented
and depending on the outcome the controller may have to take extra measures
(such as pseudonymisation or anonymization if possible and appropriate).
As an example, this means that although the research exceptions may not
50Art 89 GDPR
51Rec 62
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technically require that every single Twitter user of the millions involved in any
large-scale Twitter network research be notified that their data are used for re-
search, the logic involved in deciding to collect data and to skip the notification
must be formally documented. This documentation must also demonstrate that
appropriately storage, security and pseudonymization techniques have been con-
sidered. In addition, it is unclear whether providing information to these users
should be considered an impossible or very difficult task. In any case, the dis-
proportionate effort it would require to provide information to the data subjects
shall be demonstrated by the data controller, and is not something that should
just be taken for granted.
The concept of transparency is particularly relevant in the context of social
network research, as previously highlighted e.g. by Borgatti and Molina [4], and
as such it requires a more extensive discussion. In particular, some additional
details should provide a better description of the obligations of the data con-
troller with regard to the provision of information. There are three points that
are important here.
First, the data controller must always provide information at the time the
data is obtained (if obtained directly from the data subject) or within a reason-
able period after the data is obtained and no later than a month (if the data is
obtained indirectly) as long as this is possible given the appropriate adherence
to the research exemptions detailed above.
Second, if the controller changes the purpose of the processing, she must
provide the information to the data subject prior to this processing52. For
example, research data may have been collected for one purpose but the research
question has shifted in the course of the data analysis and these data will now be
used for a different purpose. This then speaks to how precisely the information
about processing must be specified. Looking at rec 33, even though referring
to consent, we can conclude that the specification in case of research can be a
bit more general (such as the general research area or part of the project, not
specific analytical task). Therefore changing data analysis approaches and even
research questions may not require informing the data subject anew.
Related to the above is the fact that if the change leads to further processing
that is incompatible to the initial purposes, mere information of the change does
not “whitewash” other obligations of the controller. According to art 5.1(b)
GDPR processing should comply to the purpose limitation principle. That
means that as soon as the new processing is incompatible to the initial, the
controller should either avoid the new processing or find a new lawful basis for
it. There is, however, an exception with regards to research purposes, since in
such case the further processing for such a purpose is considered to be compatible
to the initial purpose.
Third, the general principle does not assume that the methods and the
analysis are known in details at the moment of the data collection. However,
52Rec 61. See also Opinion where it is stated that in case the change is related to an incom-
patible further processing informing about the change does not “whitewash” other obligations
of the controller, such as finding another lawful basis for the changed processing or asking for
new consent
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the common practice in many areas of research where data is often collected
with no specific hypothesis/evaluation framework becomes problematic because
at least a limited explanation for the purposes of data processing is always
necessary. The GDPR recognizes that it is not always possible to know from
the beginning the entire scope of the research until the data is collected and
used. Rec 33 (in case of consent) states that data subjects should be able
to “consent only to certain areas of research or parts of research projects to
the extent allowed by the intended purpose”. Thus some specification of the
intended purpose is necessary, limiting but not entirely eradicating exploratory
forms of data collection.
3.2.2 The depth of online social network data and the principle of
data minimization
Where some network data can be collected directly in the form of network
information, that is, nodes and edges, many network datasets are obtained
through processing of other types of data. For example this is often the case
in research based on social media such as Twitter. Network studies of Twitter
can be based on the user-articulated following/followers structure, that can
be considered direct network information. At the same time, we can build
networks mapping communication processes, either explicit (replies, mentions)
or implicitly specified for example by the usage of common hashtags [15]. To
build this second type of network, researchers collect the content of users’ posts
and then extract and infer relational information. The problem arises if we
consider the implications of collecting the content of the posts to build the
network. Depending on the topic of posts, the type of content that is likely
collected may vary but could include data revealing information that is not only
identifying of natural persons but also includes sensitive data such as political
affiliation, religious belief, etc.
The GDPR makes a distinction between different types of personal data,
such as data with regards to ethnicity and sexual preferences (the so-called
sensitive personal data53), and in order for the processing to be considered
lawful the controller must respect the essence of data protection rights and
follow suitable safeguards54. Notice that data which in combination with other
data can lead to revealing sensitive data may also be considered as sensitive
data. For example name in combination with phone number, where each piece
of data is not sensitive, may constitute sensitive data together if they probably
reveal the ethnicity of a person. It is easy to see how the average stream of
messages written by an average user might easily contain sensitive personal
data or data that can be combined to reveal sensitive personal data about the
data subject. Further, such data can be derived about persons simply from
53In the context of GDPR sensitive personal data is defined as “Personal data which are, by
their nature, particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms merit specific
protection as the context of their processing could create significant risks to the fundamental
rights and freedoms.”
54Art 9 GDPR
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information produced by their connections. For example, it may be possible
to ascertain a person’s political affiliation if the majority of his connections
explicitly communicate theirs.
Handling sensitive data is not forbidden, but before starting the data col-
lection researchers need to plan some safeguards. Under the GDPR, controllers
may not process sensitive personal data except if the subject has provided her
“explicit consent”55 or the data “was manifestly made public by the data sub-
ject”56, or in case of research purposes57. While one may consider using the
concept of “manifestly made public” for special cases such as online social net-
works, where the information is publicly posted online by the users, we advise
against this interpretation. In fact, in the context of social media, as a consol-
idated body of literature has made clear, assuming when something is “man-
ifestly public” is problematic [7] and a potentially serious breach of standard
ethical research practices. On the contrary, the exemption in case of research
purposes can be used, but only if processing is necessary, in accordance to Arti-
cle 89(1), based on Union or Member State law which shall be “proportionate to
the aim pursued, respect the essence of the data protection and provide for suit-
able and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests
of the data subject.” Moreover, it seems that profiling on the basis of personal
data is forbidden unless there are “suitable safeguards”58. For example, in Swe-
den, it was recommended that one such security measure can be considered the
decisions of the relevant ethics committee59.
Finally, even if the data are not sensitive, the data minimization principle
should still apply. Using again Twitter data as an example, when researchers
collect information based on a hashtag they can fetch data using the hash-
tag with another meaning, and so not related to the study, or data using the
hashtag as was intended, but still including additional unwanted information.
This means that researchers must put in place mechanisms that will effectively
strip out unwanted data and delete it as soon as possible, acknowledging and
documenting the process.
3.3 Data analysis and profiling
Social network analysis includes a wide range of data analysis tasks. Sometimes
whole-network statistics are important, for example to correlate the communica-
tion/interaction structure of a team or organization to its performance. Some-
times meso-level structures are of interest, for example if we want to identify
communities [13, 12, 5] or other relevant sub-structures such as online conver-
sations [19, 29] inside a larger network. The identified groups can then also be
used to classify individual actors, for example assigning them to a given com-
munity or role. Other types of micro-level analysis involve the characterization
55Art 9(2)(a) GDPR
56rt 9(2)(e) GDPR
57Art 9(2)(j) GDPR
58Rec 51 GDPR
59SOU 2017:50
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of single actors, for example when the most central or prestigious actors are
identified [30]. When individuals are the object of the analysis, which is the
case for most of the tasks listed above, an important concept to be considered
is profiling.
The GDPR puts a special emphasis on the concept of profiling by specifying
the definition and codifying acceptable practices. Accordingly, in the GDPR
profiling is composed of three main stages “a) collection of personal data; b)
automated analysis to identify correlations; c) applying the correlation [the
result of b)] to an individual to identify characteristics of present or future
behaviour”60.
Note that the notion of “automated analysis” is used in the GDPR in oppo-
sition to “manual”. Although both types of processing are under the purview of
the GDPR, profiling is necessarily automated. However, automated here would
mean both the use of a statistical software for conducting any form of data anal-
ysis as well as the use of more complex approaches such as machine learning
algorithms. Thus any data analysis that includes computational assistance from
software falls under automated analysis and thus can be classified as forms of
profiling.
Given the above, many (but not all) social network analysis tasks can be clas-
sified as profiling. All centrality measures are clear examples, as they associate
results of the network analysis to specific individuals. Any analysis that singles
out individuals based on the identification of positions, roles and communities
is similarly a form of profiling.
What is the researcher to do if their activities constitute profiling of the
data subject? This does not mean that the particular data analysis is disal-
lowed. However, this may require the performance of a data protection impact
assessment (DPIA), for which the advice of the appointed data protection of-
ficer should be sought. Although the GDPR states that profiling has to be
systematic and extensive to require a DPIA, many authorities have made a
broader implementation and if profiling may affect individuals in general (e.g.
it provides custom access to services, it includes sensitive data, is related to vul-
nerable individuals, and in general the processing can lead to a high risk to the
rights and freedoms of the data subject) and if it is conducted in a large scale
combining sensitive data, then a DPIA is in general necessary. The question of
whether a DPIA is necessary is clearly a very important one, because a very
strict approach leading to an assessment for every possible case of social network
analysis can become practically problematic for the researchers. While we wait
for more guidelines61 and other legal specifications, the role of the researchers
together with the DPOs deciding on whether an assessment is needed or not
(following the law but also being practical) is of even higher importance.
Alongside profiling, DPIAs are also applicable to systematic monitoring of
individuals and locations. An interesting question arises with respect to what
constitutes locations and public spaces. For example, the GDPR mentions a
60Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP251rev.01, “Guidelines on Automated indi-
vidual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679”
61https://www.ucl.ac.uk/legal-services/research/data-protection-impact-assessment
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“systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale” as a rea-
son for a DPIA62. We are not aware of existing legal interpretations of whether
e.g. Twitter is a publicly accessible area, but the WP29 interprets “publicly ac-
cessible area” as being any place open to any member of the public, for example
a piazza, a shopping centre, a street or a public library. Clearly these are exam-
ples of physical places but Twitter is also a place that is open to any member
of the public provided they have the means to access it (an internet connection
and access to an email address). Such questions will likely be decided later on
as the regulation stands the test of time and litigation, but it is an important
item to consider for researchers conducting large-scale collection and processing
of ostensibly “public” data.
3.4 Data storage
In this section we discuss what happens after the research is concluded, in
case the researchers want to store the collected networks. If the data are still
personal, e.g., they still contain identifiers or have been pseudonymized, then
the data controller must guarantee some rights to the data subjects if she wants
to keep the network data. On a general level we can organize these rights along
three lines: a) temporal duration of personal data storage, b) the accessibility of
the stored data to the data subject, c) the right of the data subject to withdraw
his/her data. All these tasks are in general strictly regulated by the GDPR,
but with significant exemptions for research, discussed in the following section.
Under the assumption that the networks have been anonymized, then there is no
problem because the GDPR no longer applies: the data are no longer personal.
However, network anonymization is a complex issue, that we also discuss below.
3.4.1 Rights of the data subjects and the principle of storage limi-
tation
When it comes to temporal storage limitation, the GDPR states that in general
data can be “kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are
processed”, but more extended periods may apply in case of research as long as
appropriate safeguards are followed63.
No exemption because of research is instead mentioned regarding the data
subjects’ right to check if there is data concerning them, and the right to obtain
these data64. This means that when requested the controller should provide
the data, in a “commonly used and machine-readable format”65 (even if there
are possibly other national laws that may restrict this right of a data subject,
such as for example secrecy acts66). Considering the average amount of data
62Art 35(3)(c) GDPR
63Art 5(e) GDPR
64Art 15 GDPR
65Art 20 GDPR
66SOU p. 223
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represented by a single node in a typical social network project, this should
not be a problem. Nevertheless, as for other parts of this article, the size
of the network may constitute a practical difference, and for large networks
researchers should probably consider implementing an automated data filtering
functionality.
Finally, the right to erasure, also known as right to be forgotten, grants to
the data subject “the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal
data concerning him or her without undue delay”67. However, also in this case
the GDPR contains an exemption to this obligation if the erasure “is likely
to render impossible or seriously impair the achievements of the objectives of
that processing”68. Many SNA measures are not so sensitive to a small amount
of missing data [16] and the discipline has developed a set of techniques to
handle missing data. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that a significant
number of subjects requesting their data to be removed might seriously impair
the research objectives, thus researchers would have the right to legally object
to the data removal.
While these are the general guidelines emerging from the GDPR, according
to art 89(2) Member States may further limit the data subjects right to access,
rectification, restriction and to object in case of research if there are appropriate
safeguards in place, and as long as the derogation is necessary for the fulfillment
of the research.
3.4.2 Data anonymization
The GDPR asks for appropriate safeguards. The safeguards that are named in
the GDPR are technical and organizational, e.g. data minimization, pseudonymiza-
tion and anonymization. In addition, there can also be legal safeguards, such
as contractual clauses between the controller and the processor, ethical vetting
etc. [20]. Here we focus on anonymization, which should result in the data
not being re-identifiable by the controller or any other person. In social net-
work analysis, the typical approaches to anonymization are based on clustering,
graph modification or network perturbation [31].
Data anonymization approaches in general are part of a considerable debate
where some researchers argue that anonymization is impossible while others
contend that it is in some cases [10, 1, 23]. Social network data is far more
difficult to anonymize than other types of data and research on appropriate
anonymization techniques is still in its relative infancy. Many of the simpler
and more traditional approaches such as replacing node identifiers as well as
more recent and complex approaches have been critiqued as insufficient [2, 1].
The knowledge of research being conducted in a particular location by a specific
research group may be enough to reveal the identities of individuals encoded
in the network to those who are familiar with these people more directly. In a
small social network, such as for example a company division, it may be simple
for the people in the network to recognize others based on just the revealed
67Art 17 GDPR
68Art 17 GDPR
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relational patterns [4]. Such an issue is not specific of social networks, but has
been amply documented in qualitative and ethnographic research [27, 28]. As
another case, if the data are public and indexed (e.g., by Web search engines),
it can be very easy to find the original data using a part of it as a search key,
such as finding the authors of a social media post based on the text of the post.
Whether anonymization or even just pseudonymisation are generally possi-
ble in a social network context is a difficult question. The GDPR states the
necessity for privacy by design and by default but does not request specific
privacy-preserving solutions: the controller should select and apply the appro-
priate measures for each case. In the GDPR, pseudonymisation requires the
“additional information” to be “kept separately” and to be “subject to techni-
cal and organisational measures”69, which is not really possible when the data
source is public: if one removes the user identifier but keeps the text of the
post (e.g., the tweet), a simple search on a search engine or on the social media
platform can easily lead to the original, complete information. In this case, a
possibility to be considered by the researchers (but not explicitly required by
the GDPR) is to transform the text so that the analysis can still be performed
but it becomes more complicated to fetch it from the Web, such as replacing
it with a bag of words. The relevance of this discussion is that according to
rec 26 pseudonymized data is identifiable, so the GDPR applies to that, while
anonymized data is not, so the GDPR is no longer relevant. However, given the
difficulty in fully anonymizing the data we should often assume that the GDPR
is still the relevant regulation.
Even when we do not need identifiers to process social network data, be-
cause for example we are only interested in the structure of the network and
its relationship with some indicators, we still need the identifiers if we want to
extend the network, to know to which nodes the newly available information
refers to. According to the GDPR we should at the very least pseudonymise
the data “as soon as possible” (recital 78). However, it is not unusual in online
network studies to keep collecting data for months or even years, which means
that “as soon as possible” may be as late as the end of the study. One solu-
tion here is to develop or extend data collection systems with built-in network
pseudonymisation functions, for example automatically removing identifiers and
separately storing a mapping to user accounts in a location that requires special
access credentials. Such solutions may seem overly onerous given the current
accepted practices, but the GDPR forces us to rethink our attitudes towards
data collection and the impacts of our practices more broadly. In addition, the
idea of designing ethically-related features in social network analysis software
has already appeared in the literature [4].
As a final note, while in the previous paragraphs we have discussed the diffi-
culty of network data anonymization, there are specific types of social network
data where anonymization is indeed possible. In ego-network data collection
different actors are asked about their own social ties and perhaps those of their
neighbors. Ego-networks are then analysed without reconstructing a common
69Art 4(5) GDPR
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network for all of the participants. In this case, there is typically no need to
know who the individuals are, which means that we can design a data col-
lection that is already anonymised at the source. As a result, these data are
outside the scope of the GDPR given the definition of anonymous data as “data
rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is not or no longer
identifiable”70.
4 Flows of data
So far we have considered cases where only one data controller processes the
data, as in the case of a single research team based at one institution performing
the research. In practical situations it can however happen that data is stored by
a team at a university and sent to a team at another university to be analyzed,
or that two universities perform a joint data collection.
It is not the goal of this paper to examine the legal implications regarding
data flows from one jurisdiction to another but there are some things that are
worth naming here. Firstly, when it comes to transfers of personal data within
the EU, the GDPR has as a goal to “prevent divergences hampering the free
movement of personal data within the internal market”71. However, when it
comes to data related to research the situation is somewhat more complicated
since quite many issues are left to the Member States to decide72.
Moreover, regarding transfers to third, non-EU, countries, it has to be made
sure that such transfers comply to the safeguards provided for in art 44 et seq
GDPR. We will not analyze the different possibilities for such compliance to be
achieved but it is important to emphasize that when it comes to transfers of
data to entities in third countries the situation is far from problem-free. By way
of illustration such transfers are allowed if the data are sent to a “safe country”,
namely to a country recognized as a country providing an equally adequate
level of data protection as the EU countries. However for the time being these
countries are limited to a handful of – mostly minor – countries73. Alternatively,
such transfers must be based on the consent of the data subject, something
which, however, as already stated above can be difficult to be obtained in cases
of research in networks. Similarly, transfers to third countries are allowed if
the data-transferring party and the data-receiving party use an EU Standard
Contractual Clause. However such clauses have already been challenged with
regards to their ability to provide an adequate level of protection of personal
70Rec 26 GDPR
71Rec 13 GDPR
72Art 89 GDPR. For a short analysis on the matter see also Staunton C, Slokenberga
S and Mascalzoni D, ’The GDPR and the Research Exemption: Considerations on the
Necessary Safeguards for Research Biobanks’ [2019] European Journal of Human Genetics,
http://www.nature.com/articles/s41431-019-0386-5 accessed 18 June 2019.
73Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations), Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel,
Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay and the USA but only with respect
to the Privacy Shield-certified companies. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-
protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions en.
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data74.
5 Some more general issues and considerations
5.1 A code of conduct for social network research
The opportunity of writing a code of conduct for research in social network
analysis has been under discussion for a long time. In the special issue of Social
Networks on ethical dilemmas in social network research, there was a mention
to “efforts now underway within INSNA, the professional association for so-
cial network researchers, to establish a code of ethics” [8]. Several years later,
at a board meeting of the same association75 this was still under discussion,
and it was noted that many members of the association are also members of
other associations for which codes of conduct already exist (e.g., by the Ameri-
can Anthropologist Association, the American Political Science Association, the
American Sociological Association, the Association for Internet Researchers –
AOIR), questioning the need for an additional effort.
We believe that this article can contribute to this discussion. On the one
hand, we note that many issues highlighted in the previous sections are common
to other types of research not necessarily involving social networks, including
for example social science research in general, Internet research and big data
analysis, even though some specific aspects of social networks have also emerged
and the combination of relevant issues is also unique. On the other end, the
broad picture emerging from our analysis of the GDPR is a complex one, and a
whole section of the regulation76 indicates codes of conducts as a way to reduce
this complexity. In fact, once a code of conduct proposed by an association has
been approved, registered and published by a supervisory authority certifying
that the code is compliant with the GDPR and “that it provides sufficient ap-
propriate safeguards”77, then showing compliance with the code exempts the
data controller from a number of obligations. In summary, after the enforce-
ment of the GDPR the benefits of codes of conducts have increased, but their
establishment requires additional effort because they require an authority to
verify their compliance.
5.2 Towards GDPR-compliant social network software
Through the analysis of the legal obligations emerging from the GDPR we have
seen many cases where the law can be considered a bottom line for ethics, where
individual researchers shall consider more restrictive actions. For example, as we
have discussed above, the GDPR explicitly mentions “disproportionate effort”
74See Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 9 May 2018
– Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems (Case C-
311/18).
752016 Report to INSNA Membership prepared by the INSNA Officer.
76Sec 5, art 40-43
77Art 40(5)
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as a reason not to provide information to the data subjects. This, when framed
within the context of online data or of secondary analysis of already collected
large datasets, might easily be used as a solid reason to perform research without
informing the data subjects. But if it is true that large online data could easily
count millions of potential data subjects, one can expect that for online sources
it can be possible to automatically send notifications or messages informing the
data subjects. While this may result in a potentially significant overhead of
communicating with confused data subjects, the effort may be a first step in
acknowledging that people that produce data must be treated with dignity and
respect regardless of research aims. Development of standards for notification
in large-scale data collection endeavours is necessary and may need to be taken
up at the level of professional codes of conduct.
In these cases, we should also consider developing tools that can take care of
notification automatically, reducing the claim of disproportionate effort rather
than leveraging it as a way to side-step responsibilities in research. For example,
in the growing context of Twitter research, sending a short tweet mentioning
those user accounts included in the social network data collected in a research
project would be potentially interesting information for data subjects, contribut-
ing to the creation of an awareness about how much our public data is used. If
done by a relevant share of researchers (which can theoretically be achieved if
the main tool or tools for data collection are extended with this functionality)
this increased awareness could result in a consequential generalized improve-
ment in the way people manage their data online and an increased trust in
science, showing how careful researchers are about this. However, while auto-
matically sending the information to a list of users seems to require a limited
effort, turning this into practice can be problematic, as described in the next
section.
5.3 An experiment on automated data subject informa-
tion on Twitter
To better understand the amount of effort needed to notify data subjects in the
context of online social network research we have set up a protocol for a Twitter
data collection process. This experiment, briefly reported below, highlighted the
difficulty of performing even a task (appearing to be) as easy as sending some
information to online users.
First, we had to consider a number of alternatives. First, when tweets are
collected on Twitter the only contact information we have are the Twitter iden-
tifier and screen name of the accounts whose tweets were collected. This means
that we can only inform Twitter users via Twitter, and as it is typically not
possible to send direct (private) messages to generic Twitter users (for exam-
ple, users not following us who have not explicitly allowed this in their privacy
settings) we need to inform them in some way that is visible to others, such as
using a public mention.
While this is not necessarily problematic, it is interesting to see how to inform
data subjects so that we can protect their privacy we have to release additional
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information about them: our public message implies that those accounts have
posted tweets with the hashtag we were monitoring, that by the principle of
transparency we have to clearly indicate in the communication. Then, we must
decide (1) how many users to mention in the same tweet and (2) whether we
should check what their current screen name is. Both choices have an impact
on the time needed to send the notifications: including more accounts in the
same Tweet would reduce notification time, but would also again release more
information as each notified user would see the other user names in the same
tweet, knowing that they have also used the same hashtag. Checking the current
screen name would require more accesses to the Twitter API but would avoid
that we mention the wrong account because screen names can change in time.
As an indication, the Twitter API currently allows us to send 2400 tweets per
day, meaning that we would need around one year and two months to notify
one million users (using a single notification account).
An alternative is to notify users through the hashtag, sending a tweet without
mentions but with the monitored hashtag and specifying that we are collecting
tweets containing the same hashtag. This is however also problematic, first
because there is no guarantee that users will see that (they would have to search
tweets containing that hashtag, at the right time), second because for some
studies awareness of the data collection might result in a different behaviour.
Other decisions making the practical information process less trivial than
one may think are whether we should also notify accounts mentioned in the
collected tweets, even if they were not producing tweets themselves, or whether
we should notify accounts retweeting other accounts’ tweets.
After deciding on all these aspects, we started sending our tweets, including
a link to the information about the project and the data processing and also
information about the user rights. The procedure for the users to offer them
(among other things) the possibility of retrieving the data about them we had
collected was also complicated, because to prove their identity the users were
requested to follow our notification account - which is again revealing more
information about the user and also requires some effort that might discour-
age potentially interested users. After sending notifications to 45 accounts we
registered only one visit to the information page.
Finally, Twitter blocked our notification account. According to their rules,
the account had been marked as having a spamming behaviour. In the process
to reactivate the account we mentioned that despite the behaviour being com-
patible with their definition of spamming, the account was an attempt to enforce
the rights of the users to know that their tweets had been collected and why,
but this did not result in any exception, which led us to drop the experiment
after considering that developing a “smarter” bot sending the notifications and
trying to behave in a way not to be caught by Twitter’s algorithms would have
been ethically questionable.
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5.4 Public vs. private actors
Another important point of discussion is the difference in classification of uni-
versities and commercial research and industry labs. The stark difference in
legal basis for data processing and the impact on the consideration of whether
consent is a legitimate lawful basis is an important point to consider. What
does consent constitute in the context of a commercial entity when it must be
clearly uncoerced and freely given? What are the different obligations towards
data subjects for researchers depending on the legal ground they employ for
data collection? These questions have some answers in the GDPR but will be
further evolving as time and litigation test the GDPR terms and definitions.
Data availability for large scale computational social science and social network
research is necessarily connected to commercial actors [17]. Collaborators across
academic and commercial spheres have claimed the unalloyed public good that
is possible from large-scale data collection, but what impact may the GDPR
have, given the differentiation it makes between public and commercial research
efforts? How much access will public university researchers continue to have to
commercial data stores? How complex will these negotiations become? These
questions are beyond the purview of this paper, but must be discussed and
considered in the future.
6 Conclusions
Our main objective when we started writing this article was to provide a prac-
tical guide to GDPR-compliant social network data processing. Working on it,
and also trying to apply our recommendations to our own research, it became
evident that while some issues could be more easily translated into practical
suggestions, other general indications and principles in the regulation are diffi-
cult to either interpret or apply in the context of social network research. The
problems we have highlighted in the article include the difficulty of sending in-
formation to millions of users through a third-party API that does not allow it,
the problems in pseudonymizing the data as soon as possible in a continuous
network monitoring process performed with pre-GDPR software tools, the in-
terpretation of concepts such as “manifestly made public data” and “publicly
accessible areas”, the problem of removing data by user request not knowing
what impact this will have on network statistics, the practical impossibility of
guaranteeing respondent anonymity, the inclusion of data about individuals not
included in the study, as well as more general issues related to data protec-
tion emerging when social network analysis is applied to large-scale networks of
social relations derived from social media data.
In summary, it is important that everyone involved in the processing of social
network data invests some time to reflect about the implications of the GDPR
on their research, seeking help from their institutions but not only relying on
institutional support. While this may sound as an obvious statement, and legal
and ethical problems related to social network analysis and Internet research
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for social behaviour have certainly received a lot of attention in the past as
witnessed by the literature on the topic and by existing codes of conduct, the
sudden explosion of online behavioural data has indeed affected the research
landscape by both introducing new problems and involving new researchers from
disciplines where some of these problems had not been traditionally accounted
for.
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